Auerbach and literary history by Costa Lima, Luiz
118 
 
 
 
 
 
SPECIAL ISSUE – LUIZ COSTA LIMA 
 
VOLUME    11      ISSUE    11      2008 
ISSN: 1833-878X 
       Pages 118-124 
 
Luiz Costa Lima 
 
Auerbach and Literary History 
 
 
 
Although the association between Auerbach's treatment of the notion of figura and 
Hegel's concept of Aufhehung is well known, it is only by looking at the figura outside of 
this connection, and in identifying what is unique to Auerbach’s conception of it, that the 
role of figural interpretation in Auerbach’s problematic relationship to the establishment 
of literary history may be appreciated. This offers Auerbach, as Costa Lima states, ‘an 
alternative to the sort of factualistic history he had been trained in, as a philologist, and 
an operational principle that, together with the Stiltrennung, would allow him to write an 
inner history—not just an accidental and external one—of literature.’  
 
The second of three meditations on the work of Erich Auerbach included in this Special 
Issue – the others being “Erich Auerbach: History and Metahistory” (1988) and “Between 
Realism and Figuration: Auerbach’s decentered realism” (2004) – here Costa Lima 
reconsiders the relationship between the figura and mimesis conceived as the production of 
difference.   
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AUERBACH AND LITERARY HISTORY  
 
How does Auerbach relate to the tradition of literary history? To answer this question, we must identify five 
traits in nineteenth-century literary history: (a) the assumption that the passage of time is identical with progress; 
(b) the loss of the absolute prestige that mathematics had enjoyed since the Renaissance; (c) the inference that 
positive— that is, nonspeculative, nonmetaphysical, not purely rational—thinking presupposes that there are no 
interruptions or gaps between the species of entities; (d) the perfect fit, made possible by the idea of 
representation, between the creative individual, national history, and the general history of civilized nations; (e) 
the individual as the primary center, his quintessence being genius. 
 
A few comments are in order. The item (a) finds its most complete expression in evolutionism. This desideratum 
may be scientistic or it may be identified with a more "spiritual" yearning, so that literary periods are taken as 
indicators of progress being diffused through human society. Item (b), which in turn implies less emphasis on 
the conceptual, focuses more on experiments or the mere cataloging of facts than on the regulated ordering of 
ideas. Hence the proliferation of literary histories like Sismondi's, in which the author is content to present series 
of names of authors, dates, and influences, arranged diachronically and according to nationality. The safest way 
to ensure that one's work was sound was to adopt descriptive neutrality. As to (c), it is important to observe that 
this belief underlay the preference for causal description. It is not necessary to comment on items (d) and (e). 
Instead, let me try to answer the question: What were the uses of the sort of literary history I have described? 
 
It might seem strange to say that literary historians seemed to be more concerned with determining what writers 
represented than with asking historically what literature was considered to be in the period under study, or what 
specified the literary situation, or what procedures it was made up of. Could it be that, just as biologists do not 
necessarily have any empathy with the beings they investigate, literary historians left out whatever interest they 
might have in the literary object? Though Gervinus's statement, "Aesthetic judgements on objects do not 
concern me, I am neither a poet nor a lover of belles lettres,"i may be representative of his peers, it would be 
arbitrary to infer from it that literary history was programmatically anaesthetic.ii In any case, what is most 
interesting about this observation is not that it confirms this anaesthesia, but that it was not in opposition to any 
aestheticizing tendency. Though potentially anaesthetic, literary history was no less aestheticizing for that. As 
Hayden White observes, apropos of the canon of nineteenth-century historiography in general: 
 
For this tradition, whatever "confusion" is displayed by the historical record is only a surface 
phenomenon . . .  If this confusion is not reducible to the kind of order that a science of laws might 
impose upon it, it can still be dispelled by historians endowed with the proper kind of understanding. 
And when this understanding is subjected to analysis, it is always revealed to be of an essentially 
aesthetic nature.iii 
 
Aestheticness depended on the special configuration of a particular object, a literary work, only to the extent that 
it arose from the fact that the work, as a historical object, made it possible to "prove" the existence of the great 
chain that made up the world.iv This was so because aestheticization, promoted by historiography, provided a 
religious sort of satisfaction that did not require belief in any God. Further, this lay religiousness served the 
interests of the state, for it affirmed itself through celebration of the degree of civilization reached by societies, 
as reflected in their respective literatures. In this sense, as David Lloyd demonstrates, literary history had a 
political mission, justifying, in the case of Matthew Arnold and Samuel Ferguson, British domain over the Irish, 
which was supposedly beneficial to both the ruler and the ruled.v These are the questions I believe should be 
considered in an examination of the work of Erich Auerbach in literary history. Strictly speaking, Auerbach 
wrote only two theoretical essays: the "Epilegomena" to Mimesis and the "Introduction: Aim and Method" to his 
posthumous Literary Language and Its Public in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, But in his case it is the 
very distinction between theoretical and analytical essays that does not hold. Consequently, it is not material that 
we lack, but rather, to quote from Mimesis's epigraph, "world enough and time." To return to the five traits 
discussed above, it would be ridiculous even to pose the question whether Auerbach's work had anything to do 
with an evolutionist tendency. Instead, it would be more profitable to consider (b). Here it must be admitted that 
in Auerbach the conceptual mode is not particularly valued. The justification for this distaste appears in 
"Epilegomena": In the history of the spirit (Gestesgeschichte) there is no identity or strict obedience to laws 
(Gesetzlichkeit); here synthesizing abstract concepts falsify or destroy phenomena. Thus ordering should 
proceed so as to let phenomena unfold themselves freely.vi 
 
Auerbach sees this rejection of abstraktzusamenjassende Begriffe as fundamentally important to allow concrete 
approaches to effect a "historical perspectivism" ("Epilegomena," p. 16). But on close examination, it is clear 
that this passage contains more than just negatives. For how could perspectivism be achieved unless the position 
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of the observer were kept constant, so as to establish a viewpoint? Is the observer in question simply the 
author—that is, the analyst? The passage goes on to clarify: "If it had been possible, I would have avoided all 
general terms and instead suggested ideas to the reader by the mere presentation of a sequence of passages" 
("Epilegomena," p. 17). 
 
In other words, if in the human sciences (Geistesgeschichte) concepts cannot be justified from above, because 
they are not related to laws that might subsume particular cases, they are displaced to their lowest point: that at 
which generalization has the sole function of helping to provide the historical placement and the respect of the 
particularity of each text. We might then say that the subject of Auerbach's historical perspectivism is not as 
much the analyst as the language. 
 
This inference is borne out when we juxtapose the sentence quoted above to the passage in which Auerbach 
analyzes Flaubert. Concerning the impersonality of the scenes in Madame Bovary, he writes, "We hear the 
writer speak; but he expresses no opinion and makes no comment. His role is limited to selecting the events and 
translating them into language, and this is done in the conviction that every event, if one is able to express it 
purely and completely, interprets itself and the persons involved far better and more completely than any 
opinion or judgement appended to it could do."vii Thus the difference between the critic-historian and the 
novelist is that the latter can trust language completely, while the former, even if innerly resisting, must resort to 
the generalizing function of the concept. 
 
When we come to (c), once again the profound difference between Auerbach's work and the Enlightenment 
paradigm is made plain. As we have seen, the assumption of the "great chain of being" led to the operational 
prevalence of the mechanism of causality. In both historiography in general and literary history in particular, 
this prevalence presupposed the determination of a chain of causes from which a necessary constellation of 
effects derived; the chain was founded on a social—or rather, socionational—situation, and the constellation 
included author and work. We shall see shortly how Auerbach's practice diverges from this approach. 
 
As to (d) and (e), Auerbach's position is characterized less by divergence than by subtlety, which in turn already 
follows from what he had elaborated as he positioned himself in relation to (b) and (c). 
 
Let us now turn to Auerbach's interpretive practice. The crucial issue here is made up of the elements "causal 
explanation," "role of language," and "author's role as historical critic." The first decisive document is given by 
the opening chapter of Mimesis. As is well known, in this text Auerbach contrasts the Greek experience, 
represented by Homer, and the Hebrew experience, illustrated by a passage from the Old Testament. Since this 
is a familiar text, it is not necessary to do more than quote a passage that may be taken as its synthesis: "In the 
mimetic art of antiquity, the instability of fortune almost always appears as a fate which strikes from without 
and affects only a limited area, not as fate which results from the inner process of the real, historical world" 
(Mimesis, p. 29). 
 
The episodes of Odysseus's recognition by his nurse and Isaac's sacrifice represent two radically distinct modes 
of presentation. In the Greek example, everything is made explicit in the text. The narrator may even delay the 
action in order to explain in detail an accident—in the example, Odysseus's scar. In the Hebrew text, in contrast, 
the series of initial questions, culminating in the question why Jehovah orders Abraham to sacrifice his innocent 
son, are left unanswered. But the examples are not juxtaposed so that the analyst may then affirm or intimate his 
preference for either of the two modes. If in the Homeric poems man's image is simpler and less problematic, its 
greater complexity in the biblical text is counterbalanced by its tyrannical claim to truth: "The Bible's claim to 
truth is not only far more urgent than Homer's, it is tyrannical—it excludes all other claims" (Mimesis, p. 14). 
Curiously, this passage coincides with Kafka's much earlier remark on the subject, which Auerbach could not 
possibly have known.viii However, what in Kafka leads to the predicament of nonchoice, in Auerbach—a 
completely assimilated Jew—points to a solution, where the idea of figura, grounded in Hegel, is crystallized. 
But before examining it, let us ask in what sense the example we have chosen belies the mechanism of historical 
causality. The answer is quite simple: Auerbach does not attempt to submit the difference between the two 
modes of presentation to a causal explanation. Rather, he suggests that the Hebrew mode is autonomous, not 
dependent, and it may be inferred that the same is true of the Greek: "The concept of God held by the Jews is 
less a cause than a symptom of their manner of comprehending and representing things" (Mimesis, p. 8). 
 
Thus the Geistesgeschkhte does not explain cause-and-effect relationships. In it, modes of presentation—
assuming differentiated ways of constructing a narrative, independent of any sociohistorical causative 
mechanisms —are seen as able to articulate themselves and adjust to conditioning social factors. To consider 
them under this second aspect from the outset is in fact to distort them somehow, though to go no further than 
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the first aspect—that is, independence from sociohistorical mechanisms—would be no less a distortion. Both 
practices are well known in the intellectual history of the last few centuries: the first is sociologism, the second 
is idealism. The opening pages of Mimesis, then, are the start of an alternative path. What might such a path be 
like? 
 
As originally expounded, it leads to the notion that the two modes of presentation adapted to the separation of 
styles, the elevated— tragedy and epic—and the low—comedy and farce. That is: as they find their way into the 
sociohistorical atmosphere of European history, the two modes interpenetrate. But their differences do not 
cancel each other out; to say so would be to compromise the effectiveness of the modes of presentation. We 
need go no further than the chapter I have been discussing to see that such a conclusion would be a misreading 
of Auerbach. Toward the end of the discussion of Odysseus's scar, the author observes that "with the more 
profound historicity and the more profound social activity of the Old Testament text, there is connected yet 
another important distinction from Homer: namely, that a different conception of the elevated style and of the 
sublime is to be found here." But he also underscores the contrasting ways domestic realism is handled in the 
two modes: "Domestic realism, the representation of daily life, remains in Homer in the peaceful realm of the 
idyllic, whereas, from the very first, in the Old Testament stories, the sublime, tragic, and problematic take 
shape precisely in the domestic and commonplace" (Mimesis, p. 22). That is: western history is no melting pot 
in which everything blurs into an indistinct mass. On the contrary, even if Christianity has merged the two 
heritages and been carried by the same sociohistorical current as they, differences still remain. 
 
Whereas the primacy of causality in nineteenth-century historiography—and, indeed, in mainstream twentieth-
century history—eliminates the sublime, as Hayden White notes, because only a desublimized history could 
seem to be ruled by laws, in Auerbach the modes of presentation that were seminal for the West are animated on 
the one hand by the principle of beauty (the Homeric model) and on the other by the principle of the sublime 
(the Hebrew model). Auerbach confronts them precisely because he believes he can find in western thought the 
way to separate them while keeping both. Here the influence of Hegel's thought seems to have been decisive. 
 
The association between Auerbach's treatment of the notion of figura and Hegel's concept of Aufhehung is well 
known. Rather than focus on the affinity between the two, let us attempt a closer understanding of figura. 
 
The concept implies both the prefiguration of something yet to come and the historical preservation of the 
figuring and figured terms: "Figura is something real and historical which announces something else that is also 
real and historical."ix Stressing the importance of this notion in early Christian thinkers and the role it plays in 
the articulation between the Old Testament and the New, Auerbach constantly reiterates the preservation of the 
historicity between the terms compared.x He also adds that it is because this interpretive trend predominates over 
the spiritualistic, intellectualized, and abstracting one that the idea of figura, though quite close to that of 
allegory, is not to be confused with it: "Since in figural interpretation one thing stands for another, since one 
thing represents and signifies the other, figural interpretation is 'allegorical' in the widest sense. But it differs 
from most of the allegorical forms known to us by the historicity both of the sign and what it signifies" (Scenes, 
p. 54). 
 
Here we touch on a crucial point. Clearly Auerbach does not simply behave as a scholar who feels he has 
finished his task once his idea is expressed; it is obvious that this category means much to him because it 
secularizes and historicizes a principle that had originally served religious exegesis only. Further, it may be that 
he undertakes its analysis because it offers him both an alternative to the sort of factualistic history he had been 
trained in, as a philologist, and an operational principle that, together with the Stiltrennung, would allow him to 
write an inner history—not just an accidental and external one —of literature. This question cannot be asserted 
with any certainty. But the long passage below reveals his position, in an ironic, indirect way: 
 
History, with all its concrete force, remains forever a figure, cloaked and needful of interpretation. In this 
light the history of no epoch ever has the practical self-sufficiency which, from the standpoint both of 
primitive man and of modern science, resides in the accomplished fact; all history, rather, remains open 
and questionable, points to something still concealed, and the tentativeness of events in the figural 
interpretations is fundamentally different from the tentativeness of events in the modern view of 
historical development. In the modern view, the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbroken 
horizontal process; in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from above; events are 
considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but torn apart, individually, each in relation to 
something other that is promised and not yet present. Whereas in the modern view the event is always 
self-sufficient and secure, while the interpretation is fundamentally incomplete, in the figural 
interpretation the fact is subordinated to an interpretation which is fully secured to begin with: the event 
is enacted according to an ideal model which is a prototype situated in the future and thus far only 
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promised. (Scenes, p. 58-59) 
 
Dante, because he actualizes this figurativeness, is for Auerbach the diletto poet par excellence. True, one may 
read as neutral praise the passage in which he resumes the thesis of his first book, Dante als Dichter der 
irdischen Welt (1929): "For Dante the literal meaning or historical reality of a figure stands in no contradiction 
to its profounder meaning, but precisely 'figures' it; the historical reality is not annulled, but confirmed and 
fulfilled by the deeper meaning" (Scenes, p. 73). But we prefer to see Dante as the very epitome of the ideal for 
the critic-historian. With no such qualifications and much more straightforwardly, Timothy Bahti writes: "Thus, 
a history of literary secularization is a figural writing of history, a literary history with the accent on the 
adjective— an allegory of history as its own literalization."xi 
  
To round off my argument, I will add that to Auerbach the literary dynamics of the West assumes that the 
separation of styles is slowly corroded by their fusion. While Christianity paved the way for this corrosion to the 
extent that the Christian principle of equality of all men prevailed over the differentiated treatment of nobles and 
common people, ironically it was actually achieved outside the scope of Christianity, in nineteenth-century 
French realism. The crucial texts here are the chapter on Flaubert in Mimesis and Auerbach's later essay on 
Baudelaire, "Baudelaires 'Fleurs du mal' und das Erhabene" (1951). In both cases the transgression of 
Stiltrennung is emphasized. The consequent Stilvermischungh actualized by the elevated treatment of a prosaic 
subject. (The mixture of styles, I might note in passing, achieves what the separation of styles had not been able 
to do: the breakdown of the separation between the Greek and the Hebrew modes of presentation.) The 
congruency of the two passages is clear: 
 
The serious treatment of everyday reality, the rise of more extensive and socially inferior human groups 
to the position of subject matter for problematic-existential representation, on one hand; on the other, the 
embedding of random persons and events in the general course of contemporary history, the fluid 
historical background—these, we believe, are the foundations of modern realism. (Mimesis, p. 491) 
 
[Baudelaire] was the first to treat matters as sublime which seemed by nature unsuited to such treatment. 
The "spleen" of our poem is hopeless despair; it cannot be reduced to concrete causes or remedied in any 
way. A vulgarian would ridicule it; a moralist or a physician would suggest ways of curing it. But with 
Baudelaire their efforts would have been vain. (Scenes, p. 208) 
 
However, the effect of this fusion reaches far beyond the literary sphere. For all the admiration he felt for the 
French realists—"The great French novelists are of fundamental significance for the fundamental issue of 
Mimesis; my admiration for them is great" (Epikgomena, p.14)xii—Auerbach realized that there was something 
unexpected in them. Once again the comparison between the two essays is highly revealing: 
 
What is true of these two [i.e., Emma and Charles] applies to almost all the other characters in the novel; 
each of the many mediocre people who act in it has his own world of mediocre and silly stupidity, a 
world of illusions, habits, instincts, and slogans; each is alone, none can understand another, or help 
another to insight; there is no common world of men. . . . But what the world would really be, the world 
of the "intelligent," Flaubert never tells us; in his book the world consists of pure stupidity. (Mimesis, p. 
489) 
 
But what then of the hope? How can nothingness be a new sun that will bring flowers to unfolding? I 
know no answer. There is none to be found in Les Fleurs dumal. (Scenes, p. 223) 
 
Much to his merit, Bahti, relating the essay on Dante to the one on Flaubert, observes that the latter is the 
culmination of the figura contained in the former, and in this Auerbach's conception of history is revealed: 
"'History' is literally the past, figuratively its meaning as the history that is thought and written. And this history 
. . . must always reduce history as an ontological object into a dead letter, so that it might be 'meaningful,' the 
literal sign for an allegorical meaning."xiii And Bahti did not fail to notice the irony in the promise contained in 
Dante: "This, then, is the fulfillment of Dante's promise of the history of Western realism: representation 
without reality or so much as the possibility of life; truth as falsehood and nothingness; characters lacking both 
fulfillment and prefigutation of 'their own proper reality' except in their figural fulfillment as signifying 
letters."xiv 
 
Indeed, we may say that both Flaubert and Auerbach, although for different reasons, were aware that they were 
living a moment of predicament: "Are we far from the return of universal listlessness, the belief in the end of the 
world, the expectation of a Messiah? But, since the theological basis is missing, what will provide the basis for 
this enthusiasm that is unaware of itself ?"xv As to Auerbach, since it would be impossible to find a passage as 
explicit as this, it is necessary to take a more roundabout route. The advantage is that this method may throw 
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light on the possible limitsrof his critical and historical vision. 
 
In 1975, David Carroll published a devastating critique of Mimesis, showing that for all the author's suspicion of 
the effectiveness of concepts, there was a theoretical conception underlying his work. If concepts seem to him to 
verfälschen oder zerstören die Phaenomene (falsify or destroy phenomena), it is precisely because, Carroll 
argued, there is something independent from them "which makes the real predictable and comprehensible." This 
something, he then added, presupposed "the living, feeling subject," originator of the "relationship with the 
real," in which "nothing precedes or determines the relationship." In other words, "the self is the concept which 
guarantees the integrity of the present."xvi 
 
Carroll's deconstruction was no doubt exemplary. However, less than twenty years later it already begins to 
seem dated. Not that it is unfair or that the point it raises no longer seems crucial. Why, then, do Mimesis and 
the rest of Auerbach's small output remain alive, even though founded on the same epistemological fallacy? In 
order to answer this question, let us return to the predicament I mentioned above. 
 
It was because he believed in the constancy of the self, its independence from explanatory constructions, and its 
power to correct conceptual or ideological distortions that Auerbach had a particular view of mimesis. 
Schematically, this view presupposes (a) a subject that is potentially a corrector of falsifying views; and (b) "a 
profound trust in the truthfulness of language," as he wrote apropos of Flaubert. Mimesis was the precipitate of 
these two assumptions, manifesting itself as the correct and adequate representation of what free eyes were able 
to see. I should now like to add that the predicament that Auerbach identified in the mid-nineteenth century, 
specifically incarnated in Flaubert's parody of the fullness promised by the figura in Dante, may be better 
understood if we consider Auerbach's analysis of Madame Bovary in Mimesis: more precisely, his interpretation 
of discours indirect libre (free indirect style). To Auerbach, its use by Flaubert implied that the novelist left out 
his own comments, potentially enlightening for the reader, trusting the capacity for enlightenment contained in 
"the truthfulness of language." "Every event, if one is able to express it purely and completely, interprets itself 
and the persons involved in it far better and more completely than any opinion or judgement appended to it 
could do" (Mimesis, p. 486). 
 
Today we tend to feel that the interpretation of the procedure achieved much less than it could. As Dominick 
LaCapra observed, the free indirect style "involves a dialogue not only between self and objectified other but 
one within the self—a dialogue entailing a high degree of uncertainty and doubt."xvii That is why the reader 
cannot be oriented by the narrator. Further, throughout the work the boundaries between individual voices 
remain fuzzy. Is Madame Bovary a critique of French society — postrevolutionary, post-Napoleonic, 
Restoration, bourgeois, once again imperial? Of course it is. But in the name of what is this society criticized? 
Now, as long as language lacks confidence in its complete truthfulness — or rather, as long as language no 
longer enlightens the subject, freeing it from prejudices and distortions — how can mimesis be seen as a faithful 
homologue, an adequate representation of reality? Might the answer be that mimesis is rather a potential event 
and that, in the strong sense of the term (that in which an event is distinguished from a mere occurrence), it is an 
incidence that cannot be explained by a previously constituted structure? In contrast with what has been 
legitimated by an old tradition, mimesis as an event — that is, in its moments of maximum activation — is not 
homology, and thus not similarity with something previously constituted, but rather the production of difference. 
Thus Flaubert's feeling of being in a predicament was necessary for conditions to allow a reconsideration of 
mimesis. These conditions, however, were not actualized by Auerbach because he, like the rest of the generation 
that grew up before World War II, remained committed to the valuation of the individual subject and to the 
Hegelian legacy of representation. We should then be aware of this limit so that we can fruitfully return to his 
starting point. In doing so, we may well ask: How can his Greek and Hebrew modes of presentation be seen — 
since they are not to be explained in terms of determination or causality — if not as seminal events? 
 
Auerbach remains precious to us — and even this adjective is insufficient to convey his real worth — in spite of 
the deconstruction of his humanistic aporia because he is one of the few who allow us to conceive literature in 
an alternative way. For reasons of limitation of space, I shall do no more than observe that this alternative way 
allows us to look at mimesis without the anathema that we are used to attaching to it, and refashions its own 
mode of operation. Mimesis, then — let me repeat — is not a homologue, not Vorstellnng, but a disruptive 
event, a producer of difference that affects the way we understand the world. 
 
Translated by Paulo Henriques Brito 
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